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This paper develops a simple model of international trade with intermediation. We consider an economy
with two islands and two types of agents, farmers and traders. Farmers can produce two goods, but
in order to sell these goods in centralized (Walrasian) markets, they need to be matched with a trader,
and this entails costly search. In the absence of search frictions, our model reduces to a standard Ricardian
model of trade. We use this simple model to contrast the implications of changes in the integration
of Walrasian markets, which allow traders from different islands to exchange their goods, and changes
in the access to these Walrasian markets, which allow farmers to trade with traders from different islands.
We find that intermediation always magnifies the gains from trade under the former type of integration,
but leads to more nuanced welfare results under the latter, including the possibility of aggregate losses.
These welfare losses may be circumvented, however, through policies that discriminate against foreign
















Intermediaries are the grease that allows the wheels of commerce to spin.1 From small itinerant
traders picking up co⁄ee in rural Uganda to large Asian trading companies matching Western
manufacturers with local suppliers of goods or services, intermediaries are instrumental in bringing
to life the gains from international exchange. Yet, these intermediaries are rarely viewed as the
unsung heroes of globalization. Instead, they are sometimes portrayed as villains that exploit
producers in less developed countries and siphon all gains from trade away from these economies
and towards developed countries. In the words of Rodrik (2004), ￿the most direct bene￿ciaries of
increases in border prices tend to be traders and intermediaries, rather than farmers.￿More vividly,
an Oxfam International report on the co⁄ee industry states that ￿without roads or transport to
local markets, without technical backup, credit, or information about prices, the vast majority of
farmers are at the mercy of itinerant traders￿(Oxfam, 2002).
What does the theory of international trade have to tell us about the role of these intermediaries?
Unfortunately, very little. Neoclassical trade theory assumes the existence of centralized markets
where homogeneous goods are exchanged at a common, market-clearing price. New trade theory
emphasizes product di⁄erentiation and monopolistic behavior within industries, but how supply
meets demand is again not speci￿ed in those models. The purpose of this paper is to develop a
stylized but explicit model of intermediation in trade, and to use this model to shed light on the
role of intermediaries in materializing the gains from international trade as well as in a⁄ecting the
distribution of these gains.
Our starting point is a simple Ricardian model with two geographically separated islands, North
and South, and two homogeneous goods, co⁄ee and sugar. Each island is populated by a continuum
of farmers who must decide, at any point in time, whether to grow co⁄ee or sugar. We depart from
the standard Ricardian model in assuming that farmers do not have direct access to centralized
(Walrasian) markets where goods can be costlessly exchanged. Instead, farmers need to resort to
traders to conduct these transactions on their behalf. Farmers￿trading opportunities arise randomly
at a rate determined by the ratio of traders to farmers seeking trades on each island at any point
in time. We refer to this ratio as the island￿ s level of intermediation. The number of traders active
on each island is itself endogenous and pinned down by a free-entry condition.
Unlike farmers, traders are assumed to have direct access to Walrasian markets where all trades
occur at a common, market-clearing relative price. Nevertheless, the terms of exchange between
farmers and traders di⁄er from those in the centralized market, since traders exploit the lock-in
e⁄ect created by search frictions to charge a positive margin to farmers and thereby recoup the costs
they incur when intermediating trade. We model the determination of prices in bilateral exchanges
1Though it is not straightforward to quantify the importance of intermediaries in market economies, Feenstra,
Hanson and Lin (2004) estimate that, during the 1990s, Hong Kong intermediated over ￿fty percent of the volume
of China￿ s exports to the rest of the world. The early work of Wallis and North (1986) suggests that the size of
the private ￿transaction sector￿was around 41% of U.S. GNP in 1970. More recently, Spulber (1996a) provides a
conservative estimate indicating that intermediation activities account for about 25% of U.S. GDP. Such estimates
are, of course, very sensitive to the de￿nition of ￿intermediation activities.￿
1as the outcome of a generalized Nash bargaining game between each farmer and the trader he or
she is matched with.
Using this simple theoretical framework we revisit the consequences of economic integration
when trade is intermediated. We let the two islands di⁄er in their available production technologies
to grow co⁄ee and sugar, as well as in their ￿market institutions,￿which we model as exogenous
characteristics of the traders populating the two islands. More speci￿cally, we let Northern traders
be more e¢ cient than Southern traders in intermediating trade, and we also allow the primitive
bargaining power of Northern traders to be higher than that of Southern traders. For simplicity,
we further let the Northern island be large relative to the Southern one, so that we can (for the
most part) focus on the e⁄ects of integration for the Southern island and ignore the feedback e⁄ects
that this may have on the rest of the world.
How does one think about economic integration in a world economy where trading opportu-
nities are constrained by such market institutions? A ￿rst possibility is to consider the case in
which the centralized market where traders exchange goods becomes global rather than local, while
maintaining the assumption that farmers can only ￿nd trading opportunities with local traders.
Throughout the paper, we refer to this ￿rst type of integration￿ the integration of two initially
isolated Walrasian markets￿ as W-integration. Our model, however, also allows for a di⁄erent type
of integration involving the internationalization of trading opportunities, so that traders worldwide
are allowed to intermediate trade in either of the two islands. We refer to this second type of
integration￿ the integration of two initially isolated matching markets￿ as M-integration. Broadly
speaking, W-integration aims to shed light on the consequences of convergence in goods prices across
countries in the presence of intermediaries, while M-integration seeks to capture the consequences
of the entry of foreign intermediaries in local markets, regardless of whether such intermediaries
are trading companies, banks, or multinational companies in practice.
The ￿rst type of integration is analogous to the one considered by standard trade models.
Since our economy features domestic distortions associated with the bilateral exchanges between
farmers and traders, one might have anticipated the possibility of W-integration having ambiguous
welfare e⁄ects; see e.g., Bhagwati (1971). Our ￿rst result demonstrates that this is not the case:
W-integration generates Pareto gains from trade, just as in the standard Ricardian model. This
is true regardless of the parameters governing market institutions in the two islands. Rather
than aggravating distortions, we show that the endogeneity of intermediation necessarily magni￿es
the aggregate gains from trade and reduces the margins charged by traders. The integration of
Walrasian markets increases the level of intermediation in the South, which generates growth along
the transition path towards the new steady state. Furthermore, under mild regularity conditions,
this growth e⁄ect is larger in economies with lower levels of intermediation under autarky, thereby
leading to convergence across countries.
By contrast, our analysis of the e⁄ects of M-integration produces much more nuanced results.
The relatively higher pro￿tability of Northern traders (due to their lower intermediation costs and
higher bargaining power) allows them to penetrate the Southern island and intermediate trade
2there. Such process of entry naturally leads to an increase in the level of intermediation in the
South over and above the one brought about by W-integration. Nevertheless, the higher bargaining
power of Northern traders now implies an ambiguous e⁄ect of M-integration on intermediation
margins. Accordingly, social welfare in South may go up or down following M-integration. When
the (primitive) bargaining strength of traders is similar across islands and the costs of intermediation
di⁄er signi￿cantly, then M-integration is necessarily associated with an increase in social welfare in
South that is in excess of the aforementioned gains from W-integration. Intuitively, M-integration
improves the technology of intermediation in South with no adverse distributional consequences.
Conversely, when the (primitive) bargaining power of traders is disproportionately large in the
North and the costs of intermediation are similar across islands, then M-integration may decrease
social welfare in South. The reduction in Southern welfare occurs when the primitive bargaining
power of traders is large relative to certain parameters governing search frictions. In those situa-
tions, even though Southern farmers (and the South as a whole) would be better o⁄if farmers could
collectively commit to refuse any trade with Northern traders, each individual Southern farmer has
an incentive to deviate from this cooperative equilibrium and accept trades with Northern traders.
Importantly, this is true ex-post (once a trading opportunity with a Northern trader arises) as
well as ex-ante (when a farmer decides whether to actively seek trades with Northern agents or
not). The key behind this ￿prisoner￿ s dilemma￿situation and the implied possibility of aggregate
losses from trade is the trading externality underlying the search friction in goods markets. In this
environment, the bilateral negotiations between a trader and a farmer not only a⁄ect the division
of surplus among these two agents, but also a⁄ect the entry of traders and thus the rate at which
trading possibilities arise for farmers that have not yet found a match. However, farmers and
traders only bargain after they have found a match and thus their negotiations fail to internalize
this externality. We ￿nd that a necessary (though not su¢ cient) condition for there to be aggregate
losses from M-integration in South is for the margins charged by Northern traders to be larger than
those charged by Southern traders before M-integration.
At this point, it may appear that our model captures some of the concerns regarding interme-
diaries expressed by activists and exempli￿ed in our Oxfam quote above. In particular, losses from
trade seem to be associated with the ￿marginalization￿of Southern producers (in the sense that
they only ￿nd trading opportunities at a limited rate), and with the fact that Northern traders
charge exceedingly high margins for intermediating trade. A few observations are however in or-
der. First, and most obviously, our model only demonstrates the possibility of aggregate losses,
and at the same time it illustrates that integration can be a powerful mechanism to lift economies
with weak levels of intermediation out of poverty. Second, in our model, in situations in which
M-integration reduces welfare in the South, it also reduces welfare in the world because, by free
entry, the (large) North is una⁄ected by M-integration. Hence, our model does not suggest that
M-integration will amount to a transfer of surplus from the South to the North.2 Third, our model
2It is worth pointing out that this observation crucially relies on the fact that we are comparing convergent paths
rather than steady states (c.f., Diamond, 1980). In Section 5, we also brie￿ y discuss the case where South is no longer
small compared to North. In this situation, M-integration tends to increase welfare in the North while reducing it in
3is perfectly consistent with the South bene￿tting from M-integration while at the same time North-
ern traders￿margins being higher than those charged by Southern traders before M-integration. In
our model, we show that a su¢ cient statistic for welfare analysis is the margin charged by Southern
(rather than Northern) traders before and after M-integration.
The previous observations have important consequences for the optimal design of policies as
dictated by our model. For instance, although price controls in the form of ￿ oor prices or caps
on margins may help reduce the likelihood of M-integration being welfare-reducing, they can also
hinder the gains of such integration in South whenever these price controls do not appropriately
discriminate between Northern and Southern traders. To be more precise, e¢ ciency dictates that
price controls be imposed only on Northern traders, though these controls should be designed in a
way that minimizes the margins charged by Southern traders. We further show that taxing the entry
of traders can achieve the same goal as price controls without requiring discrimination between the
two types of traders, in line with WTO￿ s national treatment principle. Of course, both price controls
and entry taxes are informationally intensive. Setting them at the right level requires detailed
knowledge of several parameters of the model, or at the very least, detailed knowledge of how
changes in prices and taxes (on Northern traders) a⁄ect Southern traders￿margins, which may still
be hard for a government to observe in practice. We ￿nally explore an alternative policy that allows
the government to circumvent informational constraints. It consists in creating segmented matching
markets and providing farmers with information about their existence. If Southern farmers can
direct their search towards di⁄erent types of traders, then we show that aggregate losses from M-
integration can no longer arise. The obvious drawback of this policy intervention is that in the
context of a developing country, allowing producers to direct their search may be extremely costly
as it may require investments in transportation or infrastructure, a cost from which the present
analysis abstracts.
Our model of intermediation is admittedly stylized and does not aspire to capture the precise
workings of any particular market. The search frictions in our model merely aim to re￿ ect, in a some-
what reduced-form way, the set of frictions that inhibit the ability of producers to costlessly place
their goods in world markets, whether such frictions actually derive from time-consuming search,
from incomplete information about quality or prices, or from working-capital needs. Nonetheless,
readers insisting on a literal interpretation of our framework may ￿nd our model useful in analyz-
ing the role of itinerant traders in certain agricultural markets in Africa. In Uganda, for instance,
where co⁄ee represents close to one quarter of total exports, 85% of Robusta co⁄ee farmers sell
to itinerant traders despite the existence of nearby centralized markets; see Fafchamps and Hill
(2005). This phenomenon has been deemed important for understanding how the welfare gains
associated with terms-of-trade improvements are distributed between farmers and intermediaries
(see Fafchamps and Hill, 2008). Furthermore, there is evidence that trading externalities of the
type formalized by our model may be key in the determination of the welfare implications of these
the South. The mechanism at play, however, is a standard general equilibrium terms-of-trade e⁄ect. By improving
the intermediation technology in the South, M-integration increases the relative supply of Southern goods, and in
turn, worsens its terms of trade.
4terms-of-trade movements (see Fafchamps and Hill, 2008).3
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, we draw some ideas from a small
literature that has studied the emergence and characteristics of intermediaries in closed-economy
(and mostly partial-equilibrium) models. Important early contributions to this literature include the
work of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), Biglaiser (1993), and Spulber (1996b). As in Rubinstein
and Wolinsky (1987), we also emphasize the importance of search frictions in determining the
margins charged by intermediaries, though we do so in a general equilibrium, open-economy setup.4
In terms of the structure of our model, we borrow some tools from the sizeable literature on
search-theoretic approaches to the analysis of labor markets, which builds on the seminal paper
by Diamond (1982) and the in￿ uential work of Mortensen and Pissarides (2004).5 In that respect,
the ine¢ ciency underlying our non-standard welfare results bears a close relationship to Hosios￿
(1990a) analysis of the e¢ ciency of labor market equilibria.6 Search-theoretic models have been
applied to the study of international trade issues before, but with very di⁄erent goals in mind.
For instance, Davidson et al. (1988, 1999) and Hosios (1990b) study the workings of two-sector,
general equilibrium models featuring asymmetric search frictions in the two sectors, and revisit
the determination of comparative advantage and the e⁄ects of trade integration on labor market
outcomes (see also Costinot, 2009, and Helpman et al., 2009). Instead, in our model, search frictions
are symmetric in the two sectors.
In terms of focus, our paper is more closely related to a recent, burgeoning literature on the
role of intermediaries in world trade. On the empirical side, this literature builds on the insights
of Rauch (2001), Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004), and Feenstra and Hanson (2004) about
the importance of intermediation and networks in determining the e⁄ective costs of conducting
international trade across countries.7 More recent approaches have used ￿rm-level data to shed
further light on the factors that drive a ￿rm to seek the help of an intermediary when engaging in
international trade (see, for instance, Ahn et al., 2009, and Blum et al., 2009).
While some of these contributions o⁄er simple models to motivate the empirical analysis, the
modeling of intermediaries tends to focus on technological di⁄erences across ￿rms and on their
implications for cross-sectional predictions (at the ￿rm- or industry-level). Instead, we develop
a general equilibrium model where the rationale for intermediaries and the margins they charge
3In this context, one can also think of the signi￿cant presence of foreign ￿rms in co⁄ee production in Uganda as a
real-world counterpart to M-integration in our model. For example, the Kaweri co⁄ee plantation, which is Uganda￿ s
largest co⁄ee farm, is owned by the Neumann Ka⁄ee Gruppe based in Hamburg, Germany.
4This aspect of our analysis also is related to the work of Du¢ e et al. (2005) who study how the bid and ask
prices charged by marketmakers in over-the-counter markets are shaped by search frictions.
5See Pissarides (2000) for an overview of the early contributions to this literature and Rogerson et al. (2005) for
an account of more recent developments.
6Our results about optimal policy in economies where trade is intermediated also echo some earlier results on the
e⁄ects of minimum wages in the labor literature; see e.g. Flinn (2006).
7Morriset (1998) studies the role of intermediaries margins in shaping the gap between the retail price of seven
major commodities and the price obtained by the producers of these commodities. McMillan et al. (2003) also
argue that these intermediation margins are important for understanding the small recorded welfare gains from trade
liberalization of the cashew sector in Mozambique. Hummels et al. (2009) o⁄er evidence of price discrimination in
the shipping industry. See Stahl (1988) for an early, simple model of market power in international trading.
5stems from search frictions. By explicitly modeling market institutions we are able to draw welfare
implications for the e⁄ects of integration in a world in which middlemen intermediate trade, and
we are also able to discuss the optimal design of policies within our framework. In that respect, our
work is most closely related to the earlier work of Rauch and Watson (2004) and recent working
papers by Bardhan et al. (2009) and Chau et al. (2009), who develop complementary theories of
intermediation. Our work is however distinct in three key dimensions. First, our model is built as a
strict generalization of a standard Ricardian model of trade: when intermediation costs go to zero,
traders￿margins vanish, and the equilibrium is analogous to that of the standard model. Second,
we develop a dynamic framework where traders￿margins are shaped by both the current and future
trading opportunities of farmers. Finally, we depart from these previous authors in studying the
welfare consequences of two distinct types of economic integration.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic environment. Sec-
tion 3 characterizes the equilibrium under autarky. Section 4 and 5 analyze the consequences of
Walrasian and matching market integration, respectively. Section 6 discusses policy implications.
Section 7 o⁄ers some concluding remarks. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
2 The Basic Environment
Consider an island inhabited by a continuum of in￿nitely lived agents consuming two goods, co⁄ee
(C) and sugar (S). An exogenous measure NF of the island inhabitants are engaged in production.
We refer to this set of agents as farmers and assume that they (and only they) have access to
production technologies that allow them to produce an amount 1=aC of co⁄ee or an amount 1=aS
of sugar per unit of time. A farmer cannot produce both goods at the same date t and goods are
not storable. We denote by ￿ 2 [0;1] the share of co⁄ee farmers at a given date. For notational
convenience, we drop time indices from all our variables whenever there is no risk of confusion.
Our main point of departure from the classical Ricardian model is that farmers do not have direct
access to Walrasian markets where their output can be exchanged for that of other farmers. In order
to be able to sell part of their output and consume both goods, a farmer needs to ￿nd a trader, and
doing so may take time as described below. Traders do not spend any time engaged in production
but have access to Walrasian markets in which both goods are exchanged competitively. We denote
by p ￿ pC=pS the relative price of co⁄ee in this Walrasian market. Somewhat allegorically, we
envision a situation in which, at each date, traders (and only they) are informed about the location
on the island where trade can take place.9
The pool of potential traders on the island is large. At any point in time, potential traders can
become active or inactive. In order to remain connected to Walrasian markets, an active trader
must incur an intermediation cost equal to ￿ at each date, but stands to obtain some remuneration
8Bardhan et al. (2009) also consider two types of economic integration (trade and o⁄shoring) but their focus is
on their e⁄ect on income inequality.
9With this stark assumption we seek to capture the basic notion that, through their informational advantage,
specialized traders can facilitate producers￿access to potential buyers. One can think of the provision of quality
guarantees or trade credit as alternative means by which intermediaries perform the same function in the real world.
6when intermediating a trade for a farmer. By contrast, inactive traders are involved in an activity
that generates no income but also no disutility of e⁄ort, e.g., laying in a hammock. We assume that
the pool of potential traders is large enough to ensure that the measure of traders operating on the
island, NT, is not constrained by population size and some agents are always laying in hammocks.
Hence, in equilibrium, NT will be endogenously pinned down by free entry.




e￿rt [v (C(t);S(t)) ￿ IA (t)￿]dt
￿
,
where r > 0 is the common discount factor; IA (t) = 1 if the agent is an active trader at date
t and IA (t) = 0 otherwise; C (t) ￿ 0 and S (t) ￿ 0 are the consumption of good C and S at
date t, respectively; and v is increasing, concave, homogeneous of degree one and satis￿es the
two Inada conditions: limC!0 vC = limS!0 vS = +1 and limC!+1 vC = limS!+1 vS = 0. The
assumption that the utility function v is homogeneous of degree one guarantees that agents are
risk neutral. Combined with the Inada conditions, it also implies that both goods are essential:
v (0;S) = v (C;0) = 0 for all C and S.
The process through which farmers ￿nd traders involves search frictions. Farmers and traders
can be in two states, matched (M) or unmatched (U). We denote by uF and uT the mass of
unmatched farmers and traders at any point in time. Unmatched farmers and traders come
together randomly. The number of matches per unit of time is given by a matching function,
m(uF;uT), which is increasing, concave, homogeneous of degree one and satis￿es the two In-
ada conditions: limuF!0 muF = limuT!0 muT = +1 and limuF!+1 muF = limuT!+1 muT = 0.
The associated (Poisson) rate at which unmatched farmers meet unmatched traders is equal to
￿F (￿) ￿ m(1;￿), with ￿ ￿ uT=uF. Similarly, the rate at which unmatched traders meet un-
matched farmers is given by ￿T (￿) ￿ m(1=￿;1) = ￿F (￿)=￿. The variable ￿ is a su¢ cient statistic
for the matching rates of both agents, which we refer to as the level of ￿intermediation￿on the
island. We also assume that existing matches are destroyed at an exogenous Poisson rate ￿ > 0.
When a farmer and a trader form a match, they negotiate the terms of exchange of the output
in the hands of the farmer. Although the trader has access to a Walrasian market where co⁄ee
and sugar are exchanged at a relative price p, the bilateral terms of trade will depart from this
competitive price and will re￿ ect the (primitive) bargaining power of agents as well as their outside
options. Rather than explicitly modeling these negotiations through an extensive form game, we
simply posit that generalized Nash bargaining leaves traders with a fraction ￿ of the ex-post gains
from trade (with the latter naturally depending on outside opportunities). Both parties observe
the type of good that the farmer carries, so bargaining occurs under complete information. Let
V M
Fi denote the value function of a farmer matched with a trader and producing good i = C;S; and
let V U
F denote the value function of an unmatched farmer.11 Similarly, let V M
Ti denote the value
10We model traders as economic agents with preferences represented by the utility function V . The equilibrium
would be essentially identical if we were to model traders as pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms.
11Given that both goods are essential in consumption, it is clearly the case that unmatched farmers will attain the
7function of a trader matched with a farmer carrying good i; and V U
T denote the value function of
an unmatched trader. Formally, the Nash bargaining consumption levels of a farmer-trader match









Fi ￿ V U
F
￿1￿￿
s.t. pCFi + SFi + pCTi + STi ￿ (p=aC) ￿ IC + (1=aS)(1 ￿ IC);
where IC = 1 if the farmer carries co⁄ee and IC = 0, otherwise. As we shall see, the implicit bilateral
relative price at which goods are exchanged can easily be retrieved from these consumption levels.
Each date t is divided into three periods. First, farmers decide which goods to produce. Second,
matched farmers and traders bargain over the exchange of goods. Finally, matched traders carry
out transactions in Walrasian markets, consumption takes place, new matches are formed among
unmatched agents, and a fraction of existing matches is dissolved exogenously.
3 Autarky Equilibrium
3.1 De￿nition
We de￿ne the equilibrium at any point in time of an isolated island of the type described above as:
(i) a relative price, p; (ii) a measure of traders, NT; (iii) a share of co⁄ee farmers, ￿; (iv) a vector
of consumption levels, (CFi;SFi;CTi;STi) for i = C;S; and (v) measures of unmatched farmers and
traders, uF and uT, such that: (i) agents choose their occupations to maximize their utility; (ii)
consumption levels are determined by Nash bargaining; (iii) matches are created and destroyed
according to the aforementioned Poisson process; and (iv) Walrasian markets clear.
3.2 Equilibrium Conditions









for i = C;S, are determined. These value functions must
satisfy the following Bellman equations:
rV U











+ _ V U
F , (1)
rV M
Fi = v(CFi;SFi) + ￿
￿
V U
F ￿ V M
Fi
￿
+ _ V M
Fi , (2)
rV U





TC ￿ V U
T
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
V M
TS ￿ V U
T
￿￿
+ _ V U
T , (3)
rV M
Ti = v(CTi;STi) ￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
V U
T ￿ V M
Ti
￿
+ _ V M
Ti . (4)
Equations (1) and (2) re￿ ect the fact that unmatched farmers get zero instantaneous utility and








whereas matched farmers with good i get utility v(CFi;SFi) and become unmatched at rate ￿ (at








8which point they incur a loss of V M
Fi ￿ V U
F ). Both equations incorporate a potential capital gain
or loss of remaining in the farmer￿ s current state ( _ V U
Fi, _ V M
Fi ). Equations (3) and (4) are derived
similarly and follow from the fact that unmatched traders are subject to an intermediation cost ￿
and get matched to a co⁄ee farmer with probability ￿￿T (￿) and to a sugar farmer with probability
(1 ￿ ￿)￿T (￿), whereas traders matched with a farmer carrying good i = C;S get instantaneous
utility v(CTi;STi) ￿ ￿ and become unmatched at rate ￿.
We can now describe how the process of intermediation and Nash bargaining between farmers
and traders a⁄ect the division of surplus and the implied terms of exchange of goods C and S. As
we formally show in the Appendix, Nash bargaining between farmers and traders implies that, at
any point in time,
V M




Ti + V M
Fi ￿ V U












p ￿ Ci + ￿ Si = (p=aC) ￿ IC + (1=aS)(1 ￿ IC), (7)
where ￿ Ci ￿ CFi + CTi and ￿ Si ￿ SFi + STi denote the joint consumption of co⁄ee and sugar by
each farmer-trader match producing good i = C;S, respectively. Equation (5) simply states that
traders get a share ￿ of the surplus of any match, while equations (6) and (7) re￿ ect the fact that
Nash bargaining outcomes are Pareto e¢ cient.
Equilibrium in the island also requires that the Walrasian markets for co⁄ee and sugar clear at
any point in time. This in turn requires that
￿ ￿ CC + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ CS = ￿=aC, (8)
￿ ￿ SC + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ SS = (1 ￿ ￿)=aS, (9)
These two equations simply equate average consumption of each good by each matched pair to
the average production of this good among matched pairs participating in the Walrasian market.
Note that Walras￿law still holds in this environment: because of Equation (7), one of the two
market-clearing conditions is redundant.
The last set of equilibrium conditions relate to the evolution of the measure of matched and
unmatched farmers and traders in the island. Free entry into the trading activity ensures that the
expected utility of an unmatched trader exactly equals the expected utility of an inactive trader at
all points in time, that is,
V U
T = 0. (10)
Finally, matching frictions imply that the measure of unmatched farmers uF evolves according to
the following law of motion:
_ uF = ￿(NF ￿ uF) ￿ ￿F (￿)uF. (11)
9The ￿rst term in the right-hand-side corresponds the measure of farmers entering the unmatched
state through exogenous separations, while the second term is the measure of farmers ￿nding a
match at a given point in time. The overall measure of active traders can then be determined by
the fact that the measure of matched traders must be equal to the measure of matched farmers at
any point in time:
NF ￿ uF = NT ￿ uT. (12)
3.3 Characterization, Existence, and Uniqueness
We next brie￿ y characterize some key features the autarkic equilibrium and outline a proof of its
existence and uniqueness, with most technical details being relegated to the Appendix.
Because farmers are free to choose which good to produce at any point in time, it must be the
case that V M
FC = V M
FS ￿ V M
F at all times if both goods are produced in the autarkic equilibrium,
which is ensured by our Inada conditions. Equation (5) then directly implies V M
TC = V M
TS ￿ V M
T
at all times. Combining this observation with equations (2) and (6), we obtain (CFC;SFC) =
(CFS;SFS) ￿ (CF;SF). Similarly, equations (4) and (6) imply (CTC;STC) = (CTS;STS) ￿ (CT;ST).
In words, farmers should attain the same utility level when matched regardless of which good they
carry, which in turn implies that traders are also indi⁄erent as to the type of farmer that they get
matched with.
Armed with the previous equilibrium conditions, it is easy to characterize the relative price, p,
the share of co⁄ee farmers, ￿, and the total consumption among matched pairs, ￿ C ￿ ￿ CC = ￿ CS and
￿ S ￿ ￿ SC = ￿ SS, which are all determined in the Walrasian market. Since consumption levels are
identical for both types of farmer-trader match, equation (7) implies that the only relative price p
of co⁄ee consistent with equilibrium is
p = aC=aS. (13)
Note that p is time-invariant and identical to the relative price that would apply in a frictionless
Ricardian model in which farmers had direct access to Walrasian markets. Intuitively, search
frictions create a wedge between competitive prices and those prevailing in bilateral exchanges
and thus a⁄ect the distribution of income between farmers and traders, but these frictions have a
symmetric e⁄ect on both sectors, and thus do not distort the relative supply or demand for co⁄ee or
sugar. Similarly, because farmers and traders have identical homothetic preferences, equations (6),
(8), and (9) imply that the share of farmers producing co⁄ee is also time invariant and una⁄ected












where   (￿) ￿ [vC(￿;1)/vS(￿;1)]
￿1 is the relative demand for co⁄ee. Combining this expression with



















The joint instantaneous utility enjoyed by a matched farmer-trader pair is thus given by v
￿ ￿ C; ￿ S
￿
￿￿
and is time invariant. Because the function v (￿) is homogeneous of degree one, it is also necessarily
the case that v (￿) is proportional to the value of the farmer￿ s good in the Walrasian market (i.e.,
the joint spending of the matched pair). In the rest of the paper, we slightly abuse notation and
denote by v (p) ￿ v
￿ ￿ C; ￿ S
￿
the joint utility level (net of e⁄ort costs) of a matched farmer-trader
pair when the relative price of co⁄ee is equal to p.
We next turn to a discussion of the terms of trade in bilateral exchanges, which is at the heart
of our analysis. Throughout the paper, we will denote by ￿ 2 (0;1) the share of joint consumption
￿ C and ￿ S that is captured by the trader, with the remaining share 1 ￿ ￿ accruing to the farmer.
Equation (6) ensures that this share is common for both goods. Naturally, a higher ￿ is associated
with a distribution of surplus that is more favorable to the trader. As shown in the Appendix,
equations (1)-(5) imply that at all points in time in the autarky equilibrium, the share ￿ is given
by
￿ = ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)￿
v (p)
. (17)
Not surprisingly, the previous expression states that the share ￿ of goods captured by the trader is
decreasing in the ratio ￿ of unmatched traders to unmatched farmers. Straightforward manipulation
of equation (17) also demonstrates that, for a given value of ￿, ￿ is necessarily increasing in the
primitive bargaining power ￿.
The value of ￿ can be interpreted as the ￿traders￿margins￿ , that is, the (percentage) di⁄erence
between the world relative price, p, and the e⁄ective relative price at which a farmer sells his
or her good to a trader, pbid. To see this formally, note that the instantaneous utility function
v is homogenous of degree 1. Thus the farmer obtains an instantaneous utility level equal to
(1 ￿ ￿)v (p), and his or her consumption choices are as if the farmer￿ s income ￿and thus the price
at which the trader buys co⁄ee ￿had been reduced by a factor 1￿￿. We can hence conclude that
the traders￿(percentage) margin is equal to
￿
p ￿ pbid￿￿
p = ￿ > 0. So without risk of confusion,
we will simply refer to ￿ as the traders￿margins.
Having discussed the determination of prices in our model, we next move to characterizing the
dynamics of the level of intermediation, the value functions, and the measures of matched and
unmatched traders and farmers on the island. Using equation (3), we can rearrange the free entry






11Equation (18) simply states that the present discounted utility of a matched trader should be
equal to the present discounted utility cost of remaining active while searching for a match. It
implicitly de￿nes the level of intermediation ￿ as an increasing function of the value function V M
T ,





. In order to characterize the dynamics of the level of intermediation, we can therefore
focus on the dynamics of V M
T . Combining the Bellman equation of matched traders (4) with the
free entry condition (10) and the Nash bargaining outcome (17), we obtain
_ V M
T = (r + ￿)V M





￿ ￿ ￿ [v (p) ￿ ￿] (19)





> 0 by (18), we can conclude that the dynamics of V M
T in (19) are
unstable. The only rational expectations equilibrium is thus one in which _ V M
T = 0, which further
implies _ ￿ = _ ￿ = 0. Using the fact that _ V M
T = 0 with equations (18) and (19), the equilibrium level
of intermediation ￿ can then be expressed, at any point in time, as the implicit solution of
v (p) ￿ ￿
￿
=
r + ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿)
￿￿T (￿)
. (20)
Note that the right-hand side is an increasing function of ￿. Thus intermediation is higher in
economies with higher surplus levels v (p), lower intermediation costs ￿, and higher primitive bar-
gaining power of traders, ￿. When the cost of intermediation ￿ goes to 0, the level of ￿ implicit in
equation (20) goes to +1 and ￿ goes to 0, hence implying that farmers capture all the surplus,
just as in the Ricardian model.
Because ￿ is time-invariant, V U
F and V M
F now are the solution of a linear system of ODE,
equations (1) and (2). Since the eigenvalues of that system are both strictly positive, we must also
have _ V U
F = _ V M
F = 0 in equilibrium. In other words, all value functions must immediately jump to
their steady state values and remain constant thereafter. Combining equations (1), (2), (17), and
(20) we obtain at any point in time
rV U
F =
￿F (￿)(1 ￿ ￿)v (p)




[r + ￿F (￿)](1 ￿ ￿)v(p)
r + ￿ + ￿￿T (￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿)
. (22)
By contrast, the dynamics of uF in equation (11) are globally stable and uF slowly converges to its
steady state value given by
uF =
￿
￿ + ￿F (￿)
NF. (23)
Once the dynamics of uF is known, the dynamics of uT and NT can be computed using the de￿nition
of ￿ = uT=uF and equation (12). Since ￿ is a ￿jump￿variable, both uT and NT must jump as well
12in order to ensure that equation (20) holds at any point in time. In the steady-state, we have
uT =
￿￿
￿ + ￿F (￿)
NF, (24)
NT =
￿￿ + ￿F (￿)
￿ + ￿F (￿)
NF. (25)
As shown in the Appendix, the right-hand-side of this last equation is increasing in ￿ and hence,
the steady-state measure of traders NT is higher in economies with better production technologies,
lower intermediation costs ￿ and higher bargaining power ￿ of traders.
The previous discussion has demonstrated, by construction, the existence and uniqueness of
an autarkic equilibrium. It has also characterized some of its key features, as summarized in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 An autarkic equilibrium exists and is unique. The relative price of co⁄ee, p, the
share of co⁄ee farmers, ￿, the vector of consumption levels, (CF;SF;CT;ST), and the level of
intermediation, ￿, are constant over time and determined by equations (13)-(17) and (20). Similarly,
the lifetime utilities of all agents are time-invariant and given by equations (10), (18), (21), and
(22). By contrast, the measures of matched and unmatched farmers and traders slowly converge to
their steady-state value, equations (23)-(25).
4 Integration of Walrasian Markets
4.1 Assumptions
In the rest of this paper, we assume that the island described in section 2, which we now refer
to as ￿South￿ , opens up to trade with another island, which we call ￿North￿ . As in a standard
Ricardian model, the two islands di⁄er in the production technologies these farmers have access to.
To ￿x ideas, we assume that South has a comparative advantage in co⁄ee, so that aC=aS < a￿
C=a￿
S,
where asterisks denote variables related to the Northern island. In addition to these technological
di⁄erences, we allow the Southern and the Northern island to di⁄er in terms of their ￿market
institutions￿by which we mean: (i) their intermediation costs, ￿ and ￿￿; and (ii) the primitive
bargaining power of their traders, ￿￿ and ￿. Finally, we assume that the number of Southern
farmers, NF, is (in￿nitely) small compared to the number of Northern farmers, N￿
F. Thus the
Southern island can be viewed as a small open economy.
Throughout this section, we focus on a situation in which farmers are only able to meet traders
from their own island, as in section 2, but traders from both islands now have access to a common
Walrasian market (located, at each date, in one of many possible desert islands). This is the
situation which we refer to as W-integration. Our goal is to analyze how (unexpected) W-integration
a⁄ects the levels of intermediation, production, and welfare in the Southern island.12
12Given our assumptions on the relative size of the two islands, it is easy to check that W-integration necessarily
leaves all equilibrium variables unchanged in the Northern island.
134.2 Equilibrium Conditions
Since the Northern island is large compared to the Southern island, the relative price of co⁄ee under




By assumption, we know that pW = a￿
C=a￿
S > aC=aS. Hence Southern traders are able to exchange
co⁄ee at a higher relative price under W-integration than under autarky. The income of matched
farmer-trader pairs is therefore strictly higher if they produce co⁄ee rather than sugar; see equation
(7). As a result, all Southern farmers will immediately specialize in co⁄ee production, which
will raise the indirect utility all matched farmer-trader pairs from v (p) to v
￿
pW￿
> v (p). The
mechanism is the same as in a standard Ricardian model.13
Since Southern farmers can only match with traders from their own island, we can use the same
argument as in section 3 to show that the traders￿margins, ￿W, and the level of intermediation,
￿W, will immediately jump to their new steady state values given by:




















Equations (26) and (27) are just the counterparts of (17) and (20) with v
￿
pW￿
> v (p). Using
the two previous expressions, all other equilibrium variables can then be computed by simple
substitutions. In particular, all value functions must directly jump to their new steady state values
after W-integration.14
4.3 Intermediation, Growth, and Distributional Consequences
According to equations (20) and (27), the jump in utility levels caused by W-integration will be
associated with a jump in the level of intermediation ￿ triggered by the instantaneous entry of new
traders. Quite intuitively, by free entry, an increase in the gains from trade must be accompanied
by an expansion of the trading activity in the Southern island. As we now demonstrate, this new
e⁄ect has important implications for both growth and the distribution of the gains from trade in
that island.
First, the instantaneous increase in ￿ will slowly increase the number of matched farmers in
13Recall that by equations (6) and (7),
￿ ￿ C; ￿ S
￿
maximizes v (C;S) subject to pC + S ￿ (p=aC). Thus an increase




S necessarily expands the ￿budget set￿of a farmer-trader match specialized in co⁄ee.
14It is worth pointing out that the simple dynamics after W-integration hinge heavily on the fact that the Northern
island is large compared to the Southern island. If North was su¢ ciently small to start specializing in sugar, the
relative price of co⁄ee and the levels of intermediation would now depend on one another: a high price of co⁄ee would
lead to more entry in the Southern island, which would increase the world relative supply of co⁄ee, and in turn,
decrease its price. Hence, p
W, ￿, and ￿
￿ would slowly (and interdependently) vary over time. As we later discuss,
our main results about the welfare consequences of W-integration would, however, remain unchanged.
14the economy, as illustrated by equation (11). Starting from the autarky equilibrium, W-integration
therefore leads to GDP growth along the transition path towards the new steady state equilibrium.15
The magnitude of this ￿growth e⁄ect￿depends on the initial level of intermediation as well as the
properties of the matching technology. If the matching elasticity " ￿
dlnm(uF;uT)
dlnuT is nonincreasing
in the level of intermediation, then ceteris paribus, islands with lower levels of intermediation always
grow faster after W-integration (see Appendix).16 In this situation, trade integration tends to lead
to convergence across countries.
Second, the endogenous increase in the level of intermediation due to W-integration has distri-
butional consequences. Combining equations (26) and (27), we get
￿W = ￿ ￿
"
r + ￿ + ￿T
￿
￿W￿








where the bracket term is decreasing in ￿W. Thus the instantaneous entry of new traders re-
duces ￿W, and this implies an instantaneous improvement of the farmers￿terms of trade and an
instantaneous worsening of the traders￿terms of trade.
4.4 Welfare Consequences
Changes in the level of intermediation caused by W-integration also have interesting welfare con-
sequences. As we have already mentioned, all value functions will immediately jump to their new
steady-state value after W-integration. Hence the expressions for the expected lifetime utilities of
the di⁄erent agents are still given by equations (10), (18), (21), and (22), but with the level of
intermediation now given by ￿W > ￿. Because all these expressions are (weakly) increasing in the
level of intermediation, we can conclude that all agents in the economy are (weakly) better o⁄, and
thus W-integration generates Pareto gains from trade just as in the standard Ricardian model.
It is intuitively clear why the increased matching rate and enhanced bargaining power associated
with W-integration will bene￿t farmers. Furthermore, by free entry, it is obvious that unmatched
traders are una⁄ected by W-integration. The free entry condition is also important for understand-
ing why matched traders will bene￿t from W-integration despite the decrease in their margins.
The key is that because W-integration increases intermediation and reduces the probability with
which traders ￿nd matches, free entry dictates that the welfare level they must attain when being
matched has to be higher. Hence, matched traders also bene￿t from W-integration.
What happens to social welfare? The fact that all agents are (weakly) better o⁄ implies, a
fortiori, that social welfare goes up with W-integration. We can, however, make sharper predictions.
For the sake of clarity, let us reintroduce time indices explicitly. At any date t before W-integration,
15Although trade integration causes growth in our model, the import penetration ratio remains constant along the
transition path as the number of matched traders a⁄ect proportionally Southern GDP and Southern imports.








￿￿1, with 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, where the restriction, 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, is necessary for the Inada
conditions to hold.
15there are NF ￿ uF (t) matched pairs attaining a joint expected lifetime utility V M
F (t) + V M
T (t), a
measure uF (t) of farmers obtaining V U
F (t), and a measure uT (t) of unmatched traders with zero
expected lifetime utility. Social welfare W (t) is therefore equal to
W (t) = uF (t)V U
F (t) + [NF ￿ uF (t)]
￿
V M




where uF (t) is predetermined at date t, but V U
F (t), V M
F (t), and V M
T (t) are jump variables. By
the Bellman equations (2) and (4) and the free entry condition (10), we also know that
V M
F (t) + V M
T (t) =




Thus we can rearrange the social welfare function as




￿[NF ￿ uF (t)]
r + ￿
￿
+ [v [p(t)] ￿ ￿]
￿




Since uF (t) is predetermined at date t, equation (29) implies that in order to compute the changes
in W (t) associated with W-integration, we can focus on changes in the two jump variables, V U
F (t)
and v [p(t)]￿￿. Using equations (20) and (21) into equation (29), we can express social welfare in
the South before W-integration as:






r[NF ￿ uF (t)] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F [￿(t)]NF
r + ￿ + ￿￿T [￿(t)] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F [￿(t)]
.
As explained above, W-integration raises the surplus from trading, as captured by the utility term
v [p(t)]. This is the standard welfare gain highlighted by neoclassical models of trade. Notice,
however, that ￿(t) is increasing in the level of intermediation ￿(t) and hence it also increases
following W-integration. We can then conclude that, compared to a situation with an exogenous
level of intermediation, the integration of Walrasian markets leads to a higher (percentage) increase
in social welfare. We refer to this result as the ￿magni￿cation e⁄ect￿of intermediation. This is, of
course, the welfare counterpart of the growth e⁄ect discussed in the previous section.17
Proposition 2 summarizes our ￿ndings about the e⁄ects of W-integration.
Proposition 2 W-integration: (i) induces growth along the transition path and, if the matching
elasticity " is nonincreasing in the level of intermediation, leads to convergence across islands; (ii)
improves the farmers￿terms of trade and worsens the traders￿terms of trade; and (iii) makes all
agents (weakly) better o⁄.
17Note that, in line with Diamond (1980), we are computing the e⁄ect of W-integration taking into account the
convergent path from one steady state to another, rather than simply comparing steady-state welfare levels with and
without W-integration. While this distinction is immaterial for the qualitative results derived in this section, it turns
out to be important when analyzing the consequences of M-integration.
16In the case where the Southern island is not small relative to the Northern island, one can still
show, in spite of the more complex terms-of-trade dynamics, that: (i) the values of ￿W and
￿
￿W￿￿
at any point in time are greater than their autarky levels, ￿ and ￿￿; and: (ii) the value functions
of all agents at any point in time are also greater than their autarky levels. We can thus conclude
that W-integration increases output and makes all agents (weakly) better o⁄ at all points in time
(see Appendix for details).
5 Integration of Matching Markets
5.1 Assumptions
So far we have assumed that traders can only meet farmers from their own island. We now turn
to a situation in which traders are (unexpectedly) allowed to search for farmers in both islands
(though they can only search for farmers in one of these two islands at any point in time). We
refer to this process as matching market integration, or simply M-integration, and we show below
that the welfare implications of this type of integration are much more nuanced. In order to better
illustrate our results, we assume that W-integration has already happened and that Northern and
Southern traders have access to a common (integrated) Walrasian market where co⁄ee is exchanged
at a relative price pW = a￿
C=a￿
S.18
As before, we continue to assume that islands di⁄er in their intermediation costs and in the
primitive bargaining power of traders. In order to avoid a taxonomic exercise, we assume throughout
that Northern traders have a better intermediation technology, that is ￿ > ￿￿, and that Northern
agents, regardless of whether they are farmers or traders, tend to have high primitive bargaining
power relative to Southern agents. In particular, when Northern traders bargain with Southern
farmers, they obtain a share ￿ ￿ of the ex-post gains from trade that is higher than that obtained by
Southern traders bargaining with these same Southern farmers, that is ￿ ￿ > ￿.19
Throughout this paper, we do not take a stance on the precise source of asymmetry of bargaining
power. The large literature emanating from the seminal work of Rubinstein (1982), has uncovered
several potential determinants of primitive bargaining power. It is well-known, for instance, that
relatively impatient or risk averse agents will tend to have relatively low bargaining power, and the
same will be true about agents for which a bargaining delay might be particularly costly for reasons
other than impatience, such as credit constraints.20 For these reasons, we ￿nd it natural to focus
on the case in which, if cross-country bargaining power asymmetries exist, they are associated with
Northern agents being relatively more powerful negotiators.
Before proceeding to our analysis of the consequences of M-integration, we also need to specify
18The fact that the relative price p
W is common across countries is not important for the results below.
19Similarly, Southern traders that bargain with Northern farmers obtain a share ￿ of the ex-post gains from trade
that is lower than that obtained by Northern traders bargaining with these same Northern farmers, that is ￿ < ￿
￿.
We shall brie￿ y show, however, that Southern traders will never intermediate trade in the North in equilibrium.
20See, for instance, Rubinstein (1982), Roth (1985), and Roth and Rothblum (1982). Muthoo￿ s (1999) textbook
provides a useful survey of bargaining theory.
17how matching between agents from di⁄erent islands takes place. Consistently with our closed-
economy setup, we assume that if Northern and Southern traders both operate in the same island,
then they have the same probability of being matched with farmers from that island. In other
words, matching remains random. Farmers cannot direct their search towards one particular type
of traders. This assumption aims to capture a situation in which farmers have no information about
where traders are located in the island. Thus they simply stay in their farms and wait for traders
to show up (or not). We will come back to this assumption in more detail in section 6.
Finally, note that the heterogeneity between traders from the two islands forces us to consider
the endogenous destruction of matches. For instance, if Northern traders are much more e¢ cient
than Southern traders, it is possible for the joint surplus of a matched pair consisting of a Southern
trader and a Southern farmer to be lower than the new (post M-integration) outside opportunity of
the matched farmer (which is his or her value when being unmatched). In those circumstances, ￿all-
Southern￿partnerships should e¢ ciently dissolve. In order to introduce this possibility formally,
we assume that after matches are created, but before bargaining takes place, farmers choose the
probability ￿i 2 [0;1] with which they break their matches with traders from island i.
5.2 Equilibrium Conditions
We ￿rst study how M-integration a⁄ects the mix of traders operating in each island. Relative to
the Northern traders searching in a given island, Southern traders searching in the same island
incur a higher intermediation cost per period and, when ￿nding a match, they have relatively lower







￿￿, farmers are also more likely to stay in a match that involves a Northern
trader than to keep searching for another type of trader, ￿N ￿ ￿S. Putting all the previous pieces
together, we have that Northern traders will necessarily be more pro￿table (i.e., attain higher
welfare levels) than Southern traders under random matching; see Appendix for details. Appealing
to free entry, we can then conclude:
Lemma 1 If M-integration occurs at some unexpected date t0, then with probability one, new
matches only involve Northern traders in both islands for all t > t0.
It is important to emphasize that the previous result does not necessarily imply that M-
integration instantly wipes out all Southern traders from the world economy. When M-integration
occurs, we know that there is a positive measure of matched pairs composed of a Southern trader
and a Souther farmer. As argued above, as long as the joint value of this pair exceeds the new
value of an unmatched farmer, these pairs will not dissolve. Whether this condition holds depends
on the features of the new equilibrium, which we now describe.
Since the relative price of co⁄ee must remain ￿xed at the Northern autarky level, the joint
consumption that a trader and a farmer can attain by forming a match in either of the two islands
(i.e., v(pW) and v￿(pW)) will not be a⁄ected by M-integration and will feature no dynamics. Fur-
18thermore, Lemma 1 immediately implies that M-integration will have no e⁄ect on the North, so we
can again focus on the South.
Under M-integration, there are six types of agents potentially active in the Southern island at
any point in time: (i) unmatched Southern farmers, (ii) Southern farmers matched with Northern
traders, (iii) unmatched Northern traders, (iv) matched Northern traders, (v) Southern farmers
matched with Southern traders, and (vi) matched Southern traders. We denote by V U





TN, and V M
TS the expected lifetime utilities of these six types of agents. Using Lemma 1 and
the fact that all Southern farmers specialize in co⁄ee production, we can then express the Bellman
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￿
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F ￿ V M
FS
￿
+ _ V M
FS, (34)
rV M
TS = ￿Sv(pW) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿V M
TS + _ V M
TS, (35)
where ￿N denotes the level of intermediation in the Southern island after M-integration, and ￿N
and ￿S denote the margins of Northern and Southern traders, respectively. In addition, at all
points in time, free entry by Northern traders will necessarily imply that
V U
TN = _ V U
TN = 0.
Combining the previous expression with equations (30)-(33) and our Nash bargaining conditions,
it is easy to verify that the Northern traders￿margins, ￿N, and the level of intermediation after
M-integration, ￿N, will immediately satisfy
￿N = ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
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These two expressions are just the counterpart of Equations (26) and (27) with ￿￿ < ￿ and ￿ > ￿.
Compared to W-integration, the value of a matched farmer-trader pair, v
￿
pW￿
, remains the same,
but the level of intermediation in the South is now determined by the characteristics of Northern
traders: ￿￿ and ￿. Because only Northern traders search for matches after M-integration, only their
(Northern) parameters are relevant for the determination of ￿N. It may seem counterintuitive that
the level of intermediation in South immediately jumps to its new steady-state level and that this
level is completely independent of the intermediation cost or bargaining power of Southern traders.
After all, some Southern traders may remain active after M-integration and their measure gradually
19declines through time. The logic is the same as in sections 3 and 4: the measure of unmatched
Northern traders is a jump variable and it can always ensure that the level of intermediation is
such that the expected lifetime utility of unmatched Northern traders in South is exactly equal to
zero (independently of the measure of Southern farmers searching for matches).
Combining equations (34) and (35) with our Nash bargaining conditions, we can also show (see
proof of Lemma 1 for details) that the margins of Southern traders must also immediately jump to












1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
< 1. Equipped with equations (36)-(38), all other equi-
librium variables can then be computed by simple substitutions. In particular, it is easy to show
that all value functions must directly jump to their new steady state values.21 Using equations














































Finally, note that equations (41) and (42) imply that v
￿
pW￿
￿￿ ￿ rV U
F is a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for existing Southern matches to survive after M-integration. Using equations (36), (37)





1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿￿￿N, where ￿N is implicitly
determined by equation (37). For a given value of ￿N, the previous inequality states that existing




is high or ￿ is low.
5.3 Intermediation, Growth, and Distributional Consequences
Since ￿ > ￿￿ and ￿ < ￿, equations (27) and (37) imply that M-integration necessarily increases
the level of intermediation in South: ￿N > ￿W. Intuitively, though the entry of Northern traders
wipes out all unmatched Southern traders, these Northern traders bring a better intermediation
technology and have a higher bargaining power, so it is not surprising that their entry exceeds
that of Southern traders prior to M-integration.22 Like in section 4, this instantaneous increase
21Like in section 4, the absence of dynamics in intermediation levels and traders￿margins hinges on the fact that
North is large compared to South, which pins down the relative price of co⁄ee in the Walrasian markets.
22If both Northern and Southern farmers were completely specialized in the production of sugar and co⁄ee, respec-
tively, the same prediction would hold at any point in time (in spite of the dynamics in the relative price of co⁄ee).
20in the level of intermediation will increase the number of matched farmers in the South, thereby
generating growth along the transition path. Furthermore, for the same reasons as in section 4, if
the matching elasticity " ￿
dlnm(uF;uT)
dlnuT is nonincreasing in the level of intermediation, output in
islands with lower levels of intermediation will tend to grow faster after M-integration.
We can next study how M-integration a⁄ects the share of the surplus that farmers are able to
capture when matched with a trader. Here we have to distinguish between the cases in which the
farmer is matched with a Northern trader and in which he or she continues to be matched with
the same Southern trader as before M-integration. Let us consider the former case ￿rst. Equation
(36) suggests that the e⁄ect of M-integration on the share of surplus captured by (newly) matched
Southern farmers is in general ambiguous. On the one hand, the higher level of intermediation
￿N under M-integration tends to improve the Southern farmers￿terms of trade compared to W-
integration, i.e., ￿N tends to be lower than ￿W on that account. On the other hand, the fact that
￿ ￿ > ￿ mechanically decreases the share of consumption accruing to Southern farmers matched with
Northern traders. When Northern and Southern traders di⁄er only in their cost of intermediation,
￿ and ￿￿, the ￿rst e⁄ect implies that, as in the case of W-integration, M-integration improves the
terms of trade of newly matched Southern farmers. Nevertheless, the converse is true for the case
in which ￿ = ￿￿ and ￿ ￿ > ￿ (see Appendix for details).
What happens to the terms of trade of Southern agents that were already matched before M-
integration occurs? Comparing equations (26) and (38), we immediately see that the impact of
M-integration on the Southern traders￿margins is also ambiguous. The entry of Northern traders
in the Southern island has two e⁄ects. By increasing the level of intermediation from ￿W to ￿N,
M-integration improves the outside option of matched farmers in the Southern island, which tends
to improve their terms of trade and worsen the Southern traders￿terms of trade. But conditional
on the level of intermediation, Northern traders tend to have more bargaining power than Southern
traders, ￿ is strictly less than one in equation (38), which tends to worsen Southern farmers￿outside
option and improve the Southern traders￿terms of trade. As we demonstrate in the next section,
whether ￿S is higher or lower than ￿W will be closely related to changes in social welfare and the
so-called Hosios (1990a) condition in the search-theoretical literature.23
In addition, changes in the level of intermediation in the South would lead to an improvement in the Northern terms
of trade, i.e. a decrease in the relative price of co⁄ee, which would also raise the level of intermediation in the North.
23It is worth pointing out that, in general, one cannot rank the relative magnitude of the bargaining shares of
Northern and Southern traders, ￿
N and ￿
S. Given that the primitive bargaining power of Northern traders is higher
than that of Southern traders, it would seem intuitive that ￿
N > ￿
S. Yet, the ranking of intermediation costs,
￿
￿ < ￿, implies that the ex-post gains from trade are lower in the ￿all-Southern￿ pairs. Thus conditional on the
same outside option, V
U
F , Southern farmers tend to obtain a lower payo⁄ when matched with Southern traders, which
tends to make ￿
S greater than ￿
N. Which of the two e⁄ects dominates again depends on the relative magnitude of
the variation in primitive bargaining power, ￿ and ￿ ￿, and intermediation costs, ￿ and ￿
￿. According to equations
(36) and (38), if traders from both islands only di⁄er in their primitive bargaining power, ￿ = ￿
￿, then we should
observe that ￿
N > ￿
S. By contrast, if their di⁄erences only come from their intermediation technology, ￿ = ￿ ￿, then




Our previous discussion hints at the fact that the welfare implications of M-integration are likely
to be distinct from those of W-integration. Our ￿rst result in that respect is that, unlike in the
case of W-integration, M-integration always creates winners and losers, and thus distributional
con￿ icts. In particular, the e⁄ect on Southern traders￿welfare is always of the opposite sign to that
on Southern farmers, no matter whether the latter are matched or not at the time of M-integration.












Among existing matches, the intermediation technology, ￿, the primitive bargaining power of the
trader, ￿, and the utility level, v
￿
pW￿
are una⁄ected by M-integration. Therefore, we can conclude
that if unmatched Southern farmers win from M-integration, ￿V U
F > 0, matched Southern traders
must lose, ￿V M
TS < 0. The converse is obviously true as well: if unmatched Southern farmers lose,
Southern traders must win. By equation (42), this result implies that there is a negative relationship
between movements in V U
F and movements in ￿S. Armed with this observation, inspection of
equation (41) then reveals that the welfare e⁄ect on matched farmers is always of the same sign as
that of unmatched farmers. For instance, when V U
F goes up, ￿S goes down, and V M
FS in (41) must
necessarily go up. The intuition is simple. Among existing matches, M-integration only a⁄ects the
outside option of Southern farmers, with the latter being equal to the value of unmatched Southern
farmers. When this outside option goes up (i.e., ￿S goes down), existing pairs redistribute surplus
from traders to farmers, while the converse is true when this outside option goes down. The
likelihood of each of these two scenarios will be studied in more detail below.24
Up to this point, we have shown that there cannot be any Pareto gains or losses from M-
integration.25 This leaves open, however, the possibility of aggregate losses from trade in the
Southern island. In order to investigate this question formally, let us come back to the social welfare
function introduced in section 4.4. At any date t before M-integration and after W-integration, we
know that






















is not a⁄ected by M-integration and uF (t) is predetermined at date t, the previous
expression implies that changes in social welfare caused by M-integration, ￿W, must re￿ ect changes
24In the previous discussion, we implicitly assumed that existing Southern matches were not destroyed after M-
















(r + ￿) < 0, which
requires V
U
F goes up. In this case, unmatched and matched Southern farmers are again better o⁄, whereas Southern
traders are worse o⁄.
25Comparing convergent paths rather than steady states is important for deriving this result. If Southern traders
win from M-integration, then in the new steady state, the only winners from M-integration have disappeared, and
we would erroneously conclude that M-integration generates Pareto losses.
22in the expected lifetime utility of unmatched farmers, ￿V U
F . Given our earlier discussion of the
relationship between V U
F , V M
TS, and ￿S, this further implies the Southern traders￿terms of trade,
￿S, is a su¢ cient statistic for welfare analysis in the South.26 In particular, there will be aggregate
losses from M-integration in the South, ￿W < 0, if and only if ￿S > ￿W. This observation will
play an important role in the design of optimal policy. It suggests that governments aiming to
maximize social welfare can use the (observable) response of ￿S as a useful guide to policy, with
welfare attaining its maximum when ￿S attains its minimum. We come back to this issue in the
next section.
Using equations (36), (37), and (39) as well as their counterparts under W-integration, we can










As our analysis of the distributional consequences of M-integration already anticipates, it will prove
useful to separate the rest of our welfare analysis into two parts. First, we consider the case in
which di⁄erences in intermediation costs are the only di⁄erence in market institutions across the
two islands: ￿ < ￿￿, but ￿ = ￿ ￿. Second, we turn to the polar case in which intermediation costs
are constant, ￿ = ￿￿, but bargaining powers are not, ￿ < ￿ ￿.
If Northern and Southern traders only di⁄er in terms of their intermediation costs, equation
(44) and ￿N > ￿W immediately imply that ￿V U
F > 0 and M-integration necessarily increases
social welfare in the Southern island. Intuitively, in this case M-integration essentially provides
unmatched Southern farmers with access to a better intermediation technology, which increases the
rate at which they meet traders and, in addition, improves their bargaining positions. By a⁄ecting
the threat point in their negotiations, M-integration also makes matched Southern farmers better
o⁄ and matched Southern traders worse o⁄.
In the polar case in which Northern and Southern traders only di⁄er in terms of their bargaining
power, M-integration is equivalent to an increase in the bargaining power of unmatched traders from
￿ to ￿ ￿. As equation (44) indicates, its e⁄ect on aggregate welfare in the Southern island depends on
two forces. On the one hand, a larger ￿ implies more entry and thus a higher probability of being
matched for Southern farmers. On the other hand, once matched, Southern farmers have weaker
bargaining power. In the Appendix, we show that social welfare is increasing in ￿ if and only if
￿ ￿ " ￿
dlnm(uF;uT)
dlnuT , which in the search-theoretic literature on labor markets is referred to as
Hosios￿(1990a) condition. Hence, if ￿ ￿ ", the second force will dominate and by raising primitive
traders￿primitive bargaining power from ￿ to ￿ ￿, M-integration will reduce aggregate welfare in
the South. Note that aggregate losses in the Southern island are possible in spite of the fact that
M-integration always induces output growth compared to W-integration.
What explains these results? The source of these potentially perverse welfare results is not rent-
shifting between the two islands.27 If social welfare goes down in the South after M-integration,










+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿￿
r￿.
27A welfare analysis based on the comparison of steady states would wrongly suggest otherwise. In the new steady
23then social welfare goes down in the world as a whole. Instead, what is important here is that when
￿ ￿ ", the equilibrium in the Southern island under W-integration is ine¢ cient because it features
a disproportionate entry of traders given the matching frictions. The key behind the ine¢ ciency
is the trading externality underlying the search friction in goods markets. More speci￿cally, the
terms of exchange between a trader and a farmer not only a⁄ect the division of surplus among these
two agents, but also a⁄ect the entry of traders and thus the probabilities for unmatched farmers
and traders of ￿nding a match. Nevertheless, farmers and traders only bargain after they have
found a match and thus their negotiations will fail to internalize this externality. M-integration
only aggravates this problem because Northern traders have an even higher bargaining power, and
thus social welfare is driven down. This result clearly echoes Bhagwati￿ s (1971) celebrated results
on trade and domestic distortions. Nevertheless, we shall see that the policy response to these
potential welfare losses is very di⁄erent in this environment.
An obvious question at this point is: if unmatched Southern farmers are worse o⁄ under M-
integration, why do they trade with Northern traders? The answer is that random matching￿
which we believe ￿ttingly captures search frictions in an environment where traders are mobile, but
farmers are not￿ leads to a simple prisoner￿ s dilemma situation. Although all Southern farmers
are worse o⁄ in the equilibrium in which only Northern traders are active, each Southern farmer
individually has an incentive to trade with Northern traders. This is true both ex ante and ex post,
i.e., both before and after matches occur. Even if Southern farmers had the choice to commit not
to trade with Northern traders ex ante, each farmer would strictly prefer to trade with Northern
traders, independently of what other traders are doing. The intuition is the following. Because of
Nash bargaining, Northern traders always give Southern farmers more than what they would get
if unmatched. Since farmers are all of measure zero, they do not internalize the impact of their
own actions on the composition of traders in the island. As a result, farmers are always better o⁄
trading with Northern traders, thereby leading to the exit of all unmatched Southern traders. If
the primitive bargaining power of Northern traders is high enough, this may lead to lower aggregate
welfare in the Southern island (and the world as whole).
Our main results about the impact of M-integration are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 M-integration: (i) always induces growth along the transition path and, if the
matching elasticity " is nonincreasing in the level of intermediation, leads to convergence across
islands; (ii) always creates winners and losers; and (iii) may decrease aggregate welfare.
6 Policy
In the previous two sections we studied the e⁄ects of W- and M-integration and demonstrated the
possibility of losses from trade for the South (and the world as a whole) under the latter type of
state, it is true that matched Northern traders earn rents that used to accrue to Southern traders. But since there
are no matched Northern traders at t0, such considerations are irrelevant for computing welfare changes at that date.
24economic integration. In this section, we study alternative ways to circumvent these losses and
bring the equilibrium closer to the e¢ ciency frontier.
6.1 Price Controls
As explained above, the possibility of losses from trade is tightly related to the fact that the entry
of Northern traders may aggravate the trading externality in the Southern island. In our basic
model, there is a unique socially e¢ cient division of surplus between traders and farmers and it
is associated with the parameter con￿guration ￿ = " ￿
dlnm(uF;uT)
dlnuT . When ￿ > ", the entry of
Northern traders with a bargaining share ￿ ￿ > ￿ naturally pushes the equilibrium division of surplus
further away from the socially e¢ cient one.
To ￿x ideas, suppose for now that the Southern government (or a worldwide social planner) is
convinced that ￿ ￿ > ￿ > ". A ￿rst possible policy intervention in response to this ine¢ ciency is to
directly regulate the terms of exchange between farmers and traders. For example, the Southern
government may force Northern traders operating in South to buy co⁄ee from farmers at a relative
price no lower than pf = (1 ￿ ~ ￿)pW, where ~ ￿ is implicitly given by
~ ￿ = " ￿
(1 ￿ ")
￿



















This policy e⁄ectively puts a cap on the margin charged by Northern traders. It is straightforward
to check that the imposition of a price ￿ oor pf would lead to an e¢ cient level of entry of Northern
traders and to a level of intermediation in the South that is also socially e¢ cient. Hence, M-
integration accompanied by optimal price controls on foreign traders would necessarily increase
aggregate welfare in the South whenever ￿ > ".
A few comments are in order. First, we have presupposed that the primitive bargaining power
of farmers is ine¢ ciently low, i.e., ￿ > ". If instead we had ￿ < ", perhaps because the number
of matches is very responsive to the measure of unmatched traders in the island, then our price
￿ oors may be lower than the price that farmers would actually command in the absence of a price
control. In such case, the price-￿ oor constraint would not be binding and an upper bound on the
price of co⁄ee might actually be the right welfare-enhancing policy!
Second, the previous policy intervention assumes that the Southern government is able to dis-
criminate between Northern and Southern traders, which may go against, for example, the WTO￿ s
national treatment principle. If the Southern government had to force Southern traders to buy
co⁄ee at the same price as Northern traders, then matched Southern traders may decide to exit
right away after M-integration, which may well reduce welfare in the South on that account (see
Appendix).
25Third, getting the price ￿ oor right may, of course, be very di¢ cult in practice. For the previous
scheme to work, the Southern government needs to know, among other things, the shape of the
matching function (and, in particular, its elasticity "), the world relative demand for co⁄ee ( ),
and the intermediation costs of Northern traders, ￿￿. Although this seems highly unrealistic, our
analysis suggests a fairly simple way to implement optimal price control. Since the terms of trade
of Southern traders, ￿S, is a su¢ cient statistic for welfare analysis, the rule of thumb for the
Southern government should be to pick the minimum price pf paid by Northern traders in a way
that minimizes the value ￿S. In other words, the only variable that the Southern government
may need to observe in practice to engineer a welfare-enhancing price control is the Southern
traders￿margins. For this mechanism to work, however, it is again important that the Southern
government is allowed to impose the price control only on Northern traders. This feature of our
model constitutes an important point of departure from the standard policy recommendations
implied by models of trade in the presence of domestic distortions (c.f., Bhagwati, 1971). In
particular, the optimal tackling of the ine¢ ciency causing the (potentially) perverse welfare e⁄ects
from trade requires a policy that actively discriminates against foreign economic agents.28
Finally, note that the previous policy does more than prevent welfare losses from M-integration,
it maximizes social welfare in the South conditional on (Southern) production technologies and
(Northern) intermediation technologies. If the only goal of price control is to rule out the possibility
of welfare losses from trade for the South, then simpler policies are possible. In our model, the
increase in the level of intermediation caused by M-integration, ￿N > ￿W, tends to make farmers
mechanically better o⁄. Thus, losses from M-integration can only happen if their terms of trade
worsen, ￿N > ￿W; see equation (39). Accordingly, requiring the margins of Northern traders to
be lower than those of Southern traders under W-integration, ￿N ￿ ￿W, is su¢ cient to circumvent
losses from M-integration.29
6.2 Tax Instruments
In this environment, price controls are not the only way to achieve social e¢ ciency or rule out the
possibility of losses from trade integration. In particular, tax instruments may be used to achieve
the same goal. Suppose, for example, that the Southern government were to impose a tax (or
subsidy) ￿ on all unmatched traders ￿nding a match in a given period, with the amount ￿ being
transferred to the farmer involved in such a match. Under such a policy, the value functions of
28An informationally lighter alternative to governmental price control is fostering the creation of farmers￿coopera-
tives which would bind all farmers to sell their co⁄ee to traders at some pre-speci￿ed price (in analogy to Pissarides￿ ,
1986, model of unions in a search-theoretic model of the labor market). For e¢ ciency to be achieved, however, one
can show that the farmers￿cooperative should also be able to discriminate between Northern and Southern traders
by o⁄ering these traders di⁄erent prices (details available upon request).
29To see this, consider the situation in which the restriction on Northern traders￿margins is binding: ￿
N = ￿
W. By









c is the level of intermediation
under this constraint. This is the same expression as under W-integration except that the cost of intermediation is
￿
￿ instead of ￿. Since ￿
￿ < ￿, we can conclude that ￿
c > ￿
W, which is su¢ cient for unmatched Southern farmers to
be better o⁄ than under W-integration.
26unmatched Northern traders and unmatched Southern farmers would now satisfy
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where ￿￿ is the intermediation level under this tax regime. It is straightforward to verify that if
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then the economy will attain social e¢ ciency, just as with the price control. Note that when ￿ > ",
there is over entry and so the optimal policy requires taxing unmatched traders. The converse is
true for ￿ < ".
Compared to a price control, taxing or subsidizing entry has one important advantage. It does
not require the Southern government to discriminate between Northern and Southern traders since,
after M-integration, all unmatched traders active in the Southern island will be from the North.
This also implies this tax/subsidy scheme will never generate ine¢ cient separations of Southern
matches. In all other respects, optimal tax policy and optimal price control raise similar issues.
In principle, setting the right optimal tax/subsidy level ￿ requires detailed information about the
several parameters of the model. Nevertheless, observing the e⁄ect on the margins charged by
Southern traders may serve as a useful guide in choosing taxes, as the welfare-maximizing level of
￿ also minimizes the value of the share ￿S.
6.3 Market Design
In our model, farmers randomly meet traders from both islands. In this situation, we have shown
that M-integration may lead to aggregate welfare losses. We now discuss how changes in the
structure of matching markets (if feasible) may alleviate the risk of such losses.
Suppose that the government of the Southern island can create two segmented matching mar-
kets. Formally, it can force Southern and Northern traders to search for farmers in the Eastern
and the Western part of the island, respectively. Suppose, in addition, that this information can
be made common knowledge. In such an environment, if farmers could freely locate their farms in
either part of the island, should we still expect aggregate losses from M-integration?
In order to answer this question, we need to be more precise about the timing of the game and
our equilibrium concept. Consider, for example, the following game. At the time of M-integration,
unmatched farmers simultaneously and individually choose (once and for all) on which side of the
island they want to search. Then, after observing farmers￿decisions, unmatched traders from both
islands decide whether or not they want to search in the Southern island. It is clear that such a game
has multiple Nash equilibria, depending on which side of the island Southern farmers coordinate.
If all farmers coordinate on the Eastern part of the island, then only Southern traders will enter.
27But the converse would be true if farmers were to coordinate on the Western part of the island,
thereby leaving open the possibility of aggregate losses from M-integration.
Of course, the previous multiplicity of equilibria comes from the fact that a trader who enters
an empty part of the island does not expect any farmer to start searching for him, although it
may be optimal for some of these farmers to do so. With this in mind, a natural way to deal
with this multiplicity of equilibria is to adopt a ￿subgame perfect￿ re￿nement as in Acemoglu
and Shimer (1999). Formally, suppose that at the time of M-integration, unmatched farmers and
traders simultaneously decide where and whether to search, respectively. Now de￿ne an equilibrium
with ￿directed search￿as a situation in which: (i) unmatched farmers search in the part of the
island that maximizes their expected lifetime utility; (ii) unmatched traders active in one part of
the island make zero expected pro￿ts; (iii) inactive unmatched traders expect the rate at which
they ￿nd farmers in an empty part of the island (if any) to be such that farmers are indi⁄erent
between searching in both parts of the island; and (iv) conditional on these expectations, inactive
unmatched traders make non-positive expected pro￿ts. It is easy to check that an equilibrium with
directed search may only feature the entry of Northern traders if they increase aggregate welfare
in the Southern island. The basic argument is simple. If there was an equilibrium with aggregate
losses from M-integration because of the entry of Northern traders, then Southern traders would
expect to meet farmers on their part on the island at a rate higher than under W-integration
(because V U
F is decreasing in ￿T), which would contradict the fact that their expected pro￿ts are
non-positive.
To summarize, introducing segmented matching markets (and providing information about
these markets) is likely to circumvent aggregate losses from M-integration. In our ￿rst example,
the possibility of aggregate losses from trade hinges on a coordination failure: unmatched farmers
are coordinating on a Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium. In our second example, our ￿subgame
perfect￿re￿nement guarantees that aggregate losses can no longer arise: Northern traders will enter
the Southern island if and only if they increase aggregate welfare in the South.
Although the results in this section are admittedly quite stylized, we believe that they resonate
well with some of the issues raised by activists who emphasize the fact that farmers in developing
countries tend to be ￿marginalized￿and that this fact is important in explaining the low prices
received for their products. In this section, we have shown that providing farmers from the South
with better trading opportunities and better information about these opportunities may be su¢ cient
to help farmers solve their prisoner￿ s dilemma and avoid losses from deeper trade integration. More
generally, one would expect any reform that allows farmers to direct their search towards particular
traders, whether they are from the islands or not, to be welfare-enhancing.30 Of course, in the
context of a developing economy, if implementing such reforms requires building new roads and
investing in other infrastructure, it is likely to be very costly as well.
Proposition 4 summarizes the main results of our analysis about policy interventions.
30Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) provide a well-known model under which directed search restores e¢ ciency.
28Proposition 4 Losses from M-integration can be circumvented if: (i) price controls or entry taxes
on Northern traders are chosen by the Southern government in a way that minimizes the margins of
Southern traders; and (ii) Southern farmers are assisted in directing their search towards Northern
or Southern traders.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a simple model to study the role of intermediaries in world trade. Our model
illustrates the role of these economic agents in facilitating the realization of gains from trade across
countries in the presence of search frictions. Our analysis raises two questions. First, how does
economic integration interact with the entry of intermediaries in shaping the overall gains from
trade? And second, what do optimal policies look like in such an environment?
In this paper, we have provided answers to these questions. First, we have shown that di⁄erent
types of integration interact with the entry of intermediaries in distinct ways. While intermediaries
always magnify the gains from trade under the integration of Walrasian markets (that is, when
economic integration leads to the convergence of goods prices across countries), their presence can
also be associated with a country ￿and the world as a whole ￿incurring welfare losses under the
integration of matching markets (that is, when economic integration leads to the entry of foreign
intermediaries in local markets). Second, we have used our theoretical framework to illustrate,
among other things, that price controls and tax policy imposed on foreign traders might be welfare-
enhancing when implemented in a way that minimizes the margins charged by local traders.
Our model of intermediation in trade is special along several dimensions, but our approach
of using dynamic bargaining and matching techniques to model international transactions can be
explored and pursued in several fruitful directions. For instance, we have focused on a situation in
which only one intermediary separates farmers from centralized markets. It would be interesting to
extend our framework to allow for multiple layers of intermediation, perhaps by introducing search
frictions between local traders and foreign ones. If materializing the gains from Walrasian market
integration requires the use of additional layers of intermediation, then it becomes less obvious that
this type of integration will always produce magni￿ed gains from trade.
Another important feature of our framework is that there is a large number of traders whose
rents are dissipated through free entry. Although this may be a valid description of itinerant traders
in certain agricultural markets in Africa, there exist situations in practice in which trade is inter-
mediated by a relatively small number of trading companies, each controlling a signi￿cant market
share. In a short companion note (Antr￿s and Costinot, 2010), we have studied a variant of our
framework in which farmers and traders are in ￿xed supply and each trader obtains some positive
rents in equilibrium. The qualitative results obtained in that alternative environment are analo-
gous to those derived here. In particular, the integration of Walrasian markets generates Pareto
welfare gains, while the integration of matching markets has the potential to lead to aggregate
29welfare losses.31 The key behind those potentially harmful welfare e⁄ects is, however, distinct from
the search externality emphasized in this paper, and is instead more closely related to standard
rent-shifting e⁄ects in models with imperfectly competitive markets. Another potentially fruitful
way to study the role of market concentration in our environment would be to allow traders to form
coalitions of endogenous size among themselves.
Throughout our paper we have also assumed that farmers are risk neutral and homogeneous.
As argued before, assuming that farmers are risk averse would help microfound our assumption on
the existence of cross-country variation in primitive bargaining power. Besides this, risk aversion
could also complement some of our results in interesting ways. For instance, one could endogenize
the specialization decision of an individual farmer (instead of simply assuming it, as we have done
in our model) and study how the decision to grow co⁄ee, sugar, or both interacts with search
frictions and risk aversion. In that respect, our predicted increase in intermediation following trade
integration could encourage farmers to specialize their crops according to comparative advantage,
thereby producing additional gains from trade. As a ￿nal note, we could also introduce variation
across farmers in their productivity, geographical location or wealth (if traders also provide credit)
and use our framework to derive cross-sectional predictions regarding the use of intermediaries, the
margins that they charge, and their consequences for inequality.
31The same qualitative results can also be shown to hold in an environment with a ￿xed number of traders and a
perfectly elastic supply of farmers due, perhaps, to their choice between subsistence and market production.
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33A Proofs
Section 3.3. In the main text we have illustrated the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium by
construction, but we have omitted a few derivations, which we develop below.
Claim 1: At any point in time, the solution of the Nash bargaining problem satis￿es equations (5)-(7).
Let ￿
N denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the Nash bargaining problem. Using equations

















































as well as constraint (7). From these equations, we immediately obtain (6), which ensures by concavity and
homogeneity of degree one that CFi=SFi = CTi=STi as well as vC(CFi;SFi) = vC(CTi;STi) and vS(CFi;SFi) =
vS(CTi;STi). Plugging these equalities in the ￿rst-order conditions we ￿nally obtain equation (5). QED.
Claim 2: At any point in time, ￿ satis￿es equation (17).
Since v is homogeneous of degree one, we know that
v(CF;SF) = (1 ￿ ￿)v (p)
v(CT;ST) = ￿v (p)




F ￿ V U
F
￿
= (1 ￿ ￿)v (p) ￿ ￿F (￿)
￿
V M
F ￿ V U
F
￿
+ _ V M
F ￿ _ V U
F (A1)
[r + ￿ + ￿T (￿)]
￿
V M
T ￿ V U
T
￿
= ￿v (p) + _ V M
T ￿ _ V U
T (A2)






















F ￿ _ V U
F
￿
Multiplying equation (A1) by ￿ and equation (A2) by (1 ￿ ￿) and subtracting, we get




T ￿ V U
T
￿
[￿F (￿) ￿ ￿T (￿)]
v (p)
Equation (17) derives from the previous expression and equations (10) and (18). QED.
Claim 3: At any point in time, ￿ is the unique solution of equation (20), i.e.,
v (p) ￿ ￿
￿
=
r + ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿)
￿￿T (￿)
￿ ￿(￿).
It is immediate that ￿(￿) is continuous and strictly increasing in ￿. We next note that lim￿!0 ￿T (￿) = +1
and lim￿!+1 ￿F (￿) = +1 imply lim￿!0 ￿(￿) = 0 and lim￿!+1 ￿(￿) = +1. By the intermediate value
34theorem, these two boundary conditions and ￿0 (￿) > 0 guarantee the existence of a unique ￿ satisfying
equation (20). QED.
Claim 4: In steady state, NT is strictly increasing in ￿.
From equation (25), we have
NT =
￿￿ + ￿F (￿)
￿ + ￿F (￿)
NF ￿ ￿ (￿)NF, (A3)
We need to show that ￿












[￿ + ￿F (￿)]
2 > 0,
where the inequality follows from ￿0
F (￿) > 0 and ￿￿0
F (￿)=￿F (￿) < 1 since ￿F (￿)=￿ is decreasing in ￿.
QED.
Section 4.3. In the main text we have argued that if the elasticity "(￿) ￿ dlnm(uF;uT)/dlnuT is non-
increasing in the level of intermediation, ￿, then, ceteris paribus, islands with lower levels of intermediation
will grow faster after W-integration. We now establish this result formally.
Let us denote by NA the steady state number of matched farmer-trader pairs in the South under autarky.
Since the relative price of co⁄ee is p = aC=aS, real GDP in the South under autarky, Y A, is given by
Y A = NA=aS
Similarly, if NW denotes the steady state number of matched farmer-trader pairs in the South under W-
integration, real GDP under W-integration, Y W, is given by
Y W = (a￿
C=a￿
S)NW=aC
The two previous equations imply that the growth rate in real GDP between the autarky and W-integration
steady states, Y W=Y A, is proportional to the growth rate in the number of matches, NW=NA. In order to
establish that W-integration leads to convergence, we therefore need to show that NW=NA is decreasing in
￿.
To do so, we denote by N(v) the number of matches in equilibrium when the utility associated with
a matched farmer trader pair is equal to v in the South. With these notations, we have NW=NA =
N(vW)=N(vA), where vW ￿ v
￿
pW￿
and vA ￿ v (p). Hence, showing that NW=NA is decreasing in ￿ is
equivalent to showing that @ lnN/@ lnv is decreasing in ￿, which we now demonstrate. In steady state, we




























(r + ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿)
(r + ￿)[1 ￿ "(￿)] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿)
+
￿￿T (￿)
(r + ￿)[1 ￿ "(￿)] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿)
. (A5)
Since "(￿) and ￿T (￿) are non-increasing in ￿ and ￿F (￿) is increasing in ￿, equation (A5) implies that
@ ln￿/@ lnv is decreasing in ￿. Combining this observation with equation (A4), we obtain that @ lnN/@ lnv
is decreasing in ￿.





















which is non-increasing in ￿ for ￿ 2 [0;1], as argued in the main text. QED.
Section 4.4. In the main text we have argued that if islands are completely specialized under W-integration,






are greater than their autarky levels, ￿ and ￿
￿, at any point in time;
and: (ii) the value functions of all agents are also greater than their autarky levels at any point in time. We
now demonstrate these two results formally.
Without loss of generality, we focus on the Southern island. We assume that W-integration occurs at some
date t0. For notational convenience, we still denote by pW and ￿
W the world price and the intermediation
level, respectively, but it should be clear that they now are functions of t. Our proof proceeds in four steps.
Step 1: For all t ￿ t0, the indirect utility of a matched farmer-trader pair in the South satis￿es v(pW) ￿ v(p).
This directly derives from the fact that, like in a standard Ricardian model, a change in the relative
price of co⁄ee necessarily expands the ￿budget set￿of a farmer-trader match.
Step 2: For all t ￿ t0, the intermediation level in the South satis￿es ￿
W ￿ ￿.










T = (r + ￿)V M













Combining the two previous expressions, we obtain

















￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
￿zW￿
















, zW is a strictly increasing function of ￿
W, and thus, f is a strictly
increasing function of zW. Notice also that g
￿
pW￿
￿ g (p) by Step 1.
36The rest of our proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that there exists t1 ￿ t0 such that ￿
W < ￿.
Thus there exists t1 ￿ t0 such that zW (t1) < z with z such that 0 = f (z) + g (p). Since f is increasing
in zW and g
￿
pW￿












+ g (p) < 0 at t1. This




+ g (p) < 0 for all t > t1. (To see this note that if there was a date t2 > t1




+ g (p), then there would also exist, by continuity, a date tc 2 (t1;t2) such that





















￿ g (p), this implies
zW (tc) > zW (t1), which contradicts _ z (t) < 0 for all t 2 (t1;tc).) This further implies zW (t) ! ￿1, which
cannot be an equilibrium.
Step 3: All traders are necessarily better o⁄ under W-integration.
For unmatched traders, this directly derives from free entry. For matched traders, this derives from





￿ ￿T (￿) by Step 2.
Step 4: All farmers are necessarily better o⁄ under W-integration.
The Bellman equations associated with the farmers￿value functions are still given by equations (1) and
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￿












￿. Combining the two previous expressions with equations
(5), (10) and (18), we obtain
_ V U

















By Step 2, we know that ￿
W ￿ ￿. Using equation (A7) and the same logic as in Step 2, we can therefore











denotes the value function of an unmatched farmer
























denotes the value function of a matched farmer under autarky.
Proof of Lemma 1. Without loss of generality, we focus on the Southern island. For the same reasons as














T i , where V M
F i denotes the value function
of a Southern farmer matched with a trader from island i = N;S and V M
T i denotes the value function of a
trader from island i matched with a Southern farmer. Let uT N and uT S denote the measures of unmatched
Northern and Southern traders, respectively, searching for matches in the South. If ￿ ￿ uT N/[uT N + uT S]
denotes the fraction of unmatched Northern traders in the Southern island, the value functions of all agents










F N ￿ V U
F ;0
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)max
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V M
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F ;0
￿￿












F ￿ V M
F i
￿
+ _ V M
F i , (A10)
rV U










T i ￿ V U
T i
￿





T i = ￿iv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿i + ￿
￿
V U
T i ￿ V M
T i
￿
+ _ V M
T i , (A12)
where ￿
D denotes the level of intermediation after M-integration; and ￿i denotes the share of consumption
accruing to traders from island i, ￿S ￿ ￿, and ￿N ￿ ￿￿. The max operator in equations (A9) and (A11)
re￿ ects the fact that, on the one hand, a farmer matched with a trader from island i may now prefer to
keep searching for a trader from the other island, and on the other hand, traders from island i may at any
point in time go back to their hammocks. In this environment, ￿
i 2 [0;1] corresponds to the probability that
a Southern farmer will break a match with a trader from island i. It should be clear that all functions in
equations (A9)-(A12), including ￿
D, ￿
i, ￿, and v
￿
pW￿
, may a priori vary over time. Finally, note that free
entry requires V U
T i ￿ 0 for i = N;S. Combining this inequality with equation (A11), we obtain
V U
T i = _ V U
T i = 0, (A13)
at all points in time. The rest of our proof proceeds in three steps.
Step 1: For all t ￿ t0, we must have ￿
N ￿ ￿
S.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exists a date t such that ￿
S < ￿
N. Then, it must be
the case that ￿
S < 1 and ￿
N > 0. This implies V M
F S + V M
T S ￿ V U
F + V U
T S and V M
F N + V M
T N ￿ V U
F + V U
T N. By
equation (A13), we know that V U
T S = V U
T N = 0. Thus
V M
F S + V M
T S ￿ V M
F N + V M
T N. (A14)
Using equations (A10) and (A12), it is easy to check that
￿
_ V M
F S + _ V M
T S ￿ _ V M
F N ￿ _ V M
T N
￿
= ￿ ￿ ￿￿ + (r + ￿)
￿
V M
F S + V M
T S ￿ V M
F N ￿ V M
T N
￿
which admits a unique stable solution
V M
F S + V M
T S ￿ V M





which contradicts inequality (A14).








We consider three separate cases.
Case 1: ￿(t) 2 (0;1).
If ￿(t) 2 (0;1), then traders from both islands are actively searching for Southern farmers at date t.
Hence (A11) requires
rV U








T i ￿ V U
T i
￿
+ _ V U
T i. (A15)










F N ￿ V U
F
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
V M
F S ￿ V U
F
￿￿
+ _ V U
F . (A16)
Otherwise, Southern farmers would never accept matches with (at least) one type of traders, say those from
island i. This would imply ￿
i = 0, and so, that traders form island i would be better o⁄ staying in their
hammocks by equations (A11) and (A13).
Combining equation (A15) and (A12), we obtain
h














+ _ V M
T i ￿ _ V U
T i. (A17)
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V M
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F
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+ _ V M
F i ￿ _ V U
F . (A18)
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. Since ￿ ￿ > ￿, ￿￿ < ￿, v
￿
pW￿


















Case 2: ￿(t) = 0.
If ￿(t) = 0, then only Southern traders are searching for Southern farmers at date t. Following the exact
















What about matched Northern traders (if there are any)? Using our free entry condition, equation (A13),










￿ ￿￿ + _ V M
T N ￿ _ V U
T N. (A22)
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F
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+ _ V M
F N ￿ _ V U
F , (A23)
where we have used the fact that if Southern traders search at date t, we must have max
￿
V M





F S ￿ V U

























Because of free entry of the Southern traders, we know by equation (A11) that V M













































Case 3: ￿(t) = 1.


















































> 0. This completes the proof of Step 2.
Step 3: For almost all t > t0, we must have ￿(t) = 1.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exist t1 < t2 such that an arbitrary trader from the
Southern island is active in the Southern island for all t 2 (t1;t2). By de￿nition, we know that
V U





[v [CT S (t0);ST S (t0)] ￿ IAS (t0)￿]dt0
￿
.
Let IMS (t0) denote the indicator variable which is equal to one if the trader from the Southern island is
40matched at date t0 and zero otherwise. With this notation, we can rearrange the previous expression as
V U















Now consider an arbitrary trader from the Northern island. Suppose that this trader follows the exact
same strategy as the trader from the Southern island, i.e. he would choose to be active or inactive at
the exact same dates (conditional on the same history). Let IMN (t0) denote the indicator variable which
is equal to one if the trader from the Northern island is matched at date t0 and zero otherwise By Step
1, we know that ￿
N ￿ ￿
S, which implies PrfIMN (t0) = 1g ￿ PrfIMS (t0) = 1g for all t0. By Step 2, we
also know that ￿Nv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿￿ > ￿Sv
￿
pW￿




ZN (t0) strictly ￿rst-order stochastically dominates ZS (t0) for all t0. Since IA (t0) = 1 for all t 2 (t1;t2),









. Combining this observation with equation (A25), we obtain
V U
T N (t) > V U
T S (t), where V U
T N (t) is the expected lifetime utility of the Northern trader. By equation (A13),
we know that V U
T S (t) = V U
T N (t) = 0, a contradiction. QED.
Section 5.3. In the main text, we have argued that: (i) if ￿ > ￿￿ and ￿ ￿ = ￿, then ￿N < ￿W; and (ii) if
￿ = ￿￿ and ￿ ￿ > ￿, then ￿N > ￿W. To verify these claims, note that we can combine equations (36) and
(37) to express ￿N in the following two ways:
￿N = ￿ ￿
2
4






































Because the right-hand-side of the ￿rst equation is decreasing in ￿
N, we can conclude that, for ￿ = ￿, we
must have ￿N < ￿W, where ￿W is de￿ned in (28). On the other hand, the right-hand-side of the second
equation is increasing in ￿
N. Inspection of the equation indicates that, for ￿ = ￿￿, the larger level of ￿
N
induced by ￿ > ￿ necessarily translates into a value of ￿N that is larger than in the absence of M-integration
(that is, ￿N > ￿W). QED.
Section 5.4. In the next main text, we have argued that social welfare is increasing in ￿ if and only if
￿ ￿ " ￿ dlnm(uF;uT)/dlnuT. We now establish this result formally. For expositional purposes, we focus
on the autarky case. The other cases are similar.
By equation (29), we know that social welfare is given by



















Since uF (t) is predetermined at date t and v
￿
pW￿
is independent of ￿, this implies
dW (t)
d￿





41where Z (t) ￿ uF (t) +
￿[NF￿uF(t)]

























r + ￿ + ￿F (￿)
(r + ￿)(1 ￿ ") + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿)
, (A28)
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(r + ￿)(1 ￿ ") + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿)
￿
. (A29)
Equations (A26) and (A29) imply that W (t) is increasing in ￿ if and only if ￿ ￿ ". QED
Section 6.1. In the main text, we have argued that nondiscriminatory price control may lead to ine¢ cient
separations in the Southern island. We now demonstrate this result formally. Under price control, we know
that ~ ￿ and ~ ￿ satisfy
~ ￿ = " ￿
(1 ￿ ")
￿



















If price control is nondiscriminatory, we have ￿S = ~ ￿. In this situation, Southern traders will separate from
their matched farmers whenever ~ ￿v
￿
pW￿






































" ￿￿~ ￿. Hence, there
exist parameter values such that nondiscriminatory price control may lead to ine¢ cient separations in the
Southern island. QED.
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